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Correspondence
RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION DEFENDED
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: In the January issue of The Journal, I read an editorial dealing with 
restrictive legislation and a decision thereon emanating from the supreme court 
of South Carolina.
As this is a matter in which all practising accountants are more or less in­
terested, and one which, like the question of national prohibition, provokes 
heated discussion, I feel that I am somewhat justified in presenting some ex­
tended remarks on this controversial subject.
In the first place, let us ask the question “ Why do qualified and reputable 
accountants favor restrictive legislation?” There must be some deep-seated 
motive, because discerning men do not long pursue a course of action without 
having a reason which, to their minds at least, seems fair and satisfactory. I 
have spoken about this subject to different accountants who reside in different 
sections of the country and they all give in effect the same answer, though 
phrased in different words. Some of them say that they need restrictive legis­
lation to keep the large accounting firms out. Others say that they need it 
to hold their own business. Whether one accepts the negative or the positive 
view, the meaning is the same. These men feel that, after years of study and 
practice and the building up of a clientele from which they derive their liveli­
hood in a community, it is not in consonance with the dictates of reason to 
permit, without an effort on their part, the large accounting organizations to 
come into their particular state and deprive them of the income from the life 
vocation which they have voluntarily chosen. One of these accountants 
further said that the Institute frowns upon a member who solicits the clients 
of another member, and properly so, but that the large organizations when ex­
panding into other states do precisely the same thing but by a different method 
and on a far more colossal scale. He further stated that the local or individual 
accountant was perfectly justified in his opposition, for to him it meant liveli­
hood and the protection of himself and family, while to the large aggressive 
firm it simply meant expansion and more business.
Now, when accountants are actuated by such deep-seated motives as these, 
they naturally enlist the aid of business men and appeal to their state legisla­
tures for aid in the form of restrictive legislation. This in turn arouses the 
ire of the large firms and the profession is in a turmoil. And naturally so, 
because the large firms through the aid of their extensive investments, branch 
offices, large corps of trained assistants and all the attendant prestige, can com­
mand large corporate consolidations and audits and perform this work with a 
degree of despatch and precision quite beyond the range of the smaller prac­
titioner. And this fact is openly admitted. Yet the small accounting pro­
prietor is not ready to admit that these are good and sufficient reasons for his 
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elimination or absorption by the larger firms. He takes the phrase of the Decla­
ration of Independence literally that he is entitled to “life, liberty and the pur­
suit of happiness” and that having chosen his life-work, the machinery of 
government in the state of his choice must give him reasonable protection in its 
enjoyment. In other words he thinks there should be room for both classes.
If the above seems to be the gist of the contention among the members of 
the profession, the next question is “How can the controversy be settled?” 
Here two avenues seem to be open. One avenue leads to the courts and a con­
stitutional question.
The other leads to a still closer affiliation between the members of the pro­
fession, more regional meetings of the Institute, a frank spirit of compromise 
between both classes of accountants with the view of encouraging each class to 
do the work for which it has the best facilities, instead of adopting the ruthless 
attitude of the tiger that kills out of sheer sport, regardless of the fact whether 
its hunger is satiated or not.
Let us now look at the first method of settling this controversy, that of the 
courts. This is not so assuring against the restrictive policy.
(1) The restrictive legislation complained of has been passed by the state 
under its police power and is certainly valid if it can be shown to be reasonable 
and in the public welfare. And the reasonableness of the legislation is pri­
marily the duty of the legislature to determine. It will only be declared invalid 
by the court when it plainly transcends the limits of the police power of the 
state. I note that the learned judge of South Carolina recognizes this doc­
trine, because at the foot of page 6 of The Journal he uses the following lan­
guage “Of course this court will always seek to hold an act of the general as­
sembly as coming within the provisions of the constitutions of this state and 
the United States and will read its language with that purpose in mind.”
Moreover the police power of a state is an attribute of sovereignty. We need 
sometimes to be reminded that our form of government is a dual one and that 
the one person is a citizen of the United States subject to the behests of the 
federal laws and at the same moment of time he is also a citizen of the state 
in which he resides and subject to the observance of a still larger and more 
varied collection of laws to be found in the state code. It is easy enough to 
recite this statement of dual citizenship, but it is not so easy to realize it as 
an every-day matter of fact. Under our form of government we have forty­
eight state sovereignties, and while the state laws might be said to regulate 
the same subject matter, viz., contracts, land, wills, domestic relations, etc., 
yet the laws on these subjects are by no means uniform. However, since a state 
is a sovereignty, its legislature has ipso facto the general power to pass any laws 
in the interest of its own internal affairs, subject of course to its constitution, 
which is a part of itself, and the only limitation on this general power is to be 
found in the specific matters voluntarily surrendered by the people of all the 
states to the federal government and recited in the constitution of the United 
States. Therefore before Congress can act it must point to the right conferred 
on it through the constitution, since it is a creature of limited and not general 
powers.
Further, the police power of the state antedates by far the constitution of 
the United States. It existed during the old confederation, and may properly 
be said to have been vested in the states after the revolutionary war of 1776, 
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when they became sovereignties. During colonial days the police power was 
of course vested in the parliament of Great Britain. Because of these funda­
mental truths contained in this historic background, the tendency of the federal 
courts appears to be not to declare this kind of legislation void even in border­
line cases, but only in those where federal encroachment is clear and evident.
(2) The 14th amendment to the United States constitution declares that 
no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States. But this was held by the United 
States supreme court to mean, as the language imports, the privileges and im­
munities of national citizenship, and not to include those belonging to the citi­
zen of the state. The law of a state declared that only citizens of the United 
States be employed on public works and that citizens of the state be preferred. 
It was challenged as violating the above amendment, but in 1915 the United 
States supreme court upheld the state law.
A state statute restricting the grants of retail liquor licences to citizens of 
the state is not an unlawful discrimination against non-residents, but is a 
proper police regulation. (Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591, et al.) Of course this 
is now obsolete under national prohibition, but it illustrates the principle.
This amendment is not as all inclusive as might at first sight appear. It con­
fers no political rights on a citizen of another state such as voting, running for 
office, etc., and in McCready v. Virginia (94 U. S. 391), it was even decided that 
a state law could restrict such rights as hunting and fishing to citizens of its 
own. A non-resident physician was prohibited from practising in the state 
except when called in consultation (France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N. E. 
1041).
(3) The 14th amendment further declares that no state shall deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. In truth this 
amendment was written primarily for the liberated negro who is not mentioned 
in the amendment, but, since the language is without limitation, extending to 
“any person,” it has been applied to many forms of inequality alleged to arise 
out of state laws. In the case re Flukes (157 Mo. 125) it is said that the word 
“ protection ” means the right to call to one’s aid the laws of the state, attended 
by all their machinery of justice for the averting or redress of injuries or 
oppressions. But if a California accountant, for example being also a citizen 
of the United States, were refused a certificate to practise accounting in Oregon, 
because he was a non-resident of this state, and such were the Oregon law, 
would such a refusal amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws? 
It does not so appear. Story on the Constitution says that this clause, of its 
own force, neither confers rights nor gives privileges, and that its sole office is 
to ensure impartial legal protection to such as under the laws may exist. 
Surely the right to practise law or accountancy can not be the right of a citizen 
as such. It seems that instead of being rights these are privileges granted by 
the state to certain citizens because of special qualifications and in the public 
welfare. Therefore, how can this constitutional amendment be invoked to 
protect the Californian accountant in the enjoyment of a privilege sought by 
him in Oregon, but of which he is not yet possessed, and of which he can not 
be possessed until he complies with the Oregon law by becoming a resident?
The legal points heretofore discussed appear to be those most appropriate 
to our controversy, and in support of the exercise of the police power of the state, 
226
Correspondence
but no one can be sure of the result of litigation and the most that can be done 
is to show tendencies through former adjudications. Even the learned justices 
disagree, as is well known from the majority and minority opinions rendered.
Regarding the case decided by the supreme court of South Carolina, the court 
simply followed the statute. The state board of accountancy made a ruling 
contrary to the provisions of the statute and in so doing tried to take the place 
of the legislature. This is a salutary lesson to state boards whose members 
seem to think that they are justified in making any rulings they deem necessary 
whether to carry out the purpose of the act or otherwise, and I can vouch for 
the fact that such practice is not by any means limited to South Carolina.
That portion of the court’s decision which speculates upon the possibilities 
of “ unconstitutionality,” in case the accountant had been required to maintain 
an office in the state, is merely an off-hand opinion in passing, has no legal effect 
in the case, and is purely obiter dicta.
If such a state of facts were properly before the court and the authorities 
consulted, it is difficult to say just what the learned jurist’s opinion would be. 
Until such a time arrives the conclusion arrived at can not be taken seriously 
and has no value as a precedent. The bad feature about it, however, is that it 
has such an appearance, and many persons will regard it as such.
There were also obiter dicta uttered by the celebrated Chief Justice Taney 
in the Dred Scott case. The effect was to encourage the southern states in 
their viewpoint of the slavery question, and this ended disastrously in the civil 
war. It is always best to arrive at decisions based on the facts of the instant 
case. Keep away from prophecy, and permit the future to take care of itself.
And now that the issues of this litigation have been settled by me in favor 
of the states (to which the opposite side will, of course, never agree) let me state 
frankly that I think this is a problem for the accountants themselves to work 
out through the American Institute. But it can only be done in a spirit of 
conciliation and compromise. Even that venerable document—the constitu­
tion of the United States—was born in the spirit of compromise. It was not 
possible otherwise. No accountant is as great as the profession to which he 
belongs. He has his status because of it and owes it loyalty. There are men 
of varied talents in it, the keen and the mediocre, the well to do and the fairly 
prosperous, the grave and the gay. We have striven since 1896 to give it proper 
recognition in the economic life of the state and nation. Today this is an 
accomplished fact. Let us keep the professional view-point and not quarrel 
about big business. There should be room for all. As a member of the 
American Bar Association I know that through a fine spirit of cooperation that 
organization is accomplishing uniformity in legislation that could not have 
been obtained otherwise. If argumentative persons can cooperate, certainly
accountants can. Yours truly,
Arthur Berridge.
Portland, Oregon, January 14, 1931.
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